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Consumers’ choices are typically influenced by choice context in ways that standard models
cannot explain. We provide a concise explanation of the attraction, compromise and similarity
effects. Value is assumed to be determined by simple dominance relations between choice
options and sampled comparators, and selection of comparators is assumed to be systematically
influenced by the choice options. In one experiment, participants viewed differing selections
of market options prior to choice. The classic context effects appeared and disappeared as
predicted. In the second experiment, individuals’ sampling distributions of market options
were influenced by the choice set as predicted by the model. JEL: C9, D03, D12.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A well-established challenge to the standard utility model is given by the existence of con-
text effects in consumer choice. Context effects occur when the relative frequency with which
one option is chosen over another depends on the other options in the choice set. In this paper
we consider the three most-studied context effects found in multi-attribute choice experiments:
the similarity effect (Tversky, 1972), the attraction effect (Huber et al., 1982) and the compro-
mise effect (Simonson, 1989).
We illustrate the three context effects in Figure I which shows choice options located within
price × quality space. Consider the low-quality, low-price option A, and the higher-quality,
higher-price optionB. The attraction effect occurs when one of two options is more likely to be
chosen after a third option that it (and only it) dominates is introduced, e.g., p(A|{A,B, TA}) >
p(A|{A,B, TB}). The compromise effect occurs when an option is more likely to be chosen
when it becomes an intermediate option, e.g., p(B|{A,B,CB}) > p(B|{A,B,CA}). The
similarity effect occurs when the introduction of a third option that is similar to one of the alter-
natives increases the probability of choosing the dissimilar alternative, e.g., p(A|{A,B, SA}) >
p(A|{A,B, SB}).
[Figure I about here.]
These three context effects have been replicated many times in a variety of domains (e.g,
Doyle et al., 1999; Huber et al., 1982), and within a single study (Berkowitsch et al., 2014;
Noguchi and Stewart, 2014). Moreover, the fit of discrete-choice models can be improved by
adding estimable parameters for each context effect and some of their interactions (Rooderkerk
et al., 2011). The classical utility paradigm built on the assumption of rational preference
orderings renders choice invariant to the introduction of seemingly irrelevant alternatives, and
hence is not able to explain these phenomena without substantial modification.
In this paper we offer a concise account based on a single cognitive mechanism, based
on a large body of independent psychological evidence. We term the model Multi-Attribute
Decision by Sampling (MADS). It contrasts with previous accounts provided in both economics
and psychology. For example, it has been shown that the compromise effect can result as
3equilibrium behaviour in markets under uncertainty where the choice set provides information
for the decision-maker (e.g., Kamenica, 2008; Wernerfelt, 1995). However, these accounts of
context effects do not well explain why the effects are found experimentally in domains where
it is less plausible that the options carry information regarding decision-relevant attributes such
as quality (e.g., consumer choices over gifts of coupons and cash Tversky and Simonson (1993)
or choices over lotteries Wedell (1991)). Furthermore, Trueblood et al. (2013) show these ‘big
three’ context effects appear when individuals judge psychophysical stimuli, suggesting that the
mechanism underlying the effects is a more fundamental component of the human decision-
making process. In economics, existing accounts of some of the effects have been based on
psychological factors such as dimensional weighting (Bushong et al., 2015), salience (Bordalo
et al., 2013), limited attention (Masatlioglu et al., 2012) and reference points (Ok et al., 2015).
More specifically, several economic models assume that attraction effects occur because
the addition of a decoy changes the attention or weight assigned to the dimension on which the
dominating item is superior to the target. For example, Bushong et al. (2015) assume that a unit
difference along a dimension is weighted less if the range of values on that dimension (from
worst to best) increases. Attraction effects occur in this model because the introduction of a
decoy (e.g., TA in Figure I) reduces the weight on the quality dimension (on which A is inferior
to B in Figure I) hence increasing the attractiveness of A relative to B. The salience model of
Bordalo et al. (2013) assumes greater weight is assigned to attribute values that are more distant
from the average value on that attribute. MADS differs from these models in a number of ways;
in particular, our model emphasises the importance of binary ordinal dominance relations and
allocates no role to salience or to range effects per se. We discuss the relation between our
model and these alternative accounts in more detail in Section V.
There are also psychological models of choice that account for all three of the major context
effects (e.g., Bhatia, 2013; Roe et al., 2001; Trueblood et al., 2014; Usher and McClelland,
2004). However, none capture the three effects with one psychological mechanism, instead
resorting to arguably ad-hoc parametrizations. Furthermore, most of these models are complex
and can only be estimated numerically. We offer a novel single-mechanism account of the three
consumer choice context effects based on sampling, while maintaining analytic expressibility.
4Our model instantiates three key assumptions. The first assumption is that individuals eval-
uate choice options by comparing them to a limited sample of other items. The idea that judge-
ments and choices are based on a process of sampling comparator items from memory and/or
the immediate choice environment is ubiquitous in psychology (e.g. Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler and
Juslin, 2006; Hertwig and Pleskac, 2010) and is strongly supported by the existence of context
effects of the type discussed in the present paper. Related ideas are found in several recent
economic models (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2012a, 2013; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; Ko˝szegi and
Szeidl, 2013).
The second assumption is that the probability of choosing an alternative is determined via
dominance relations between items in the mental sample. This assumption is consistent with a
large body of research in psychology which suggests that subjective valuations involve a series
of simple ordinal comparisons between items (e.g. Stewart et al., 2006; see also Kornienko,
2013). For example, the Decision by Sampling model (Stewart et al., 2006) assumes that the
subjective values of attribute values are determined by (a) retrieving a small sample of compar-
ison items drawn from memory and the environment, (b) tallying the number of comparison
attribute values that are smaller than the target attribute value, (c) tallying the number of com-
parison attribute values that are larger than the target attribute value, and (d) computing the
relative ranked position of the target attribute value within the comparison context provided
by the comparison sample. Stewart et al. use these assumptions to explain the form of, inter
alia, the value and probability weighting functions in Prospect Theory. The key psychologi-
cal assumption that MADS inherits from DbS is the idea that purely ordinal comparisons are
involved in the construction of subjective values. A considerable amount of evidence within
both economic and psychological domains finds effects of the relative rank of attribute values
within a context on subjective valuations of those attribute values, consistent with the sugges-
tion that (in process terms) valuations are constructed through a series of ordinal comparisons.
An initial strand of research that examined people’s judgements of the subjective magnitudes
of simple psychophysical quantities such as size and weight found such judgements to be de-
termined partly by the relative ranked position they occupy within a comparison context (e.g.,
Parducci et al., 1960; Parducci and Perrett, 1971; Riskey et al., 1979). Subsequent work found
5that quantities as diverse as prices (Niedrich et al., 2001; Niedrich et al., 2009), personality
(Wood et al., 2012b), fairness (Mellers, 1982), body perception (Wedell et al., 2005) and al-
cohol consumption (Wood et al., 2012a), as well as many others, are judged at least partly in
terms of their relative ranked position within a comparison context. Within economic contexts,
students’ attitudes to anticipated graduation debt is determined partly by the ranked position
of their anticipated debt relative to the assumed debt of others (Aldrovandi et al., 2014). Rank
of income, rather than income per se, determines satisfaction with that income (Boyce et al.,
2010; Smith et al., 1989), and people’s anticipated and experienced satisfaction with a wage are
both related to how the wage ranks within a comparison context (Brown et al., 2008). More-
over, some neuro-imaging evidence is consistent with a rank-based coding of value in the brain
(Mullett and Tunney, 2013).
The third assumption is that the sampling process is systematically influenced by the choice
set. We assume that a given choice set will be taken by subjects to suggest the presence of
unobserved market options which the subject may therefore include in the sample they generate.
More specifically, in our model people behave as if they infer a distribution over the whole
marketplace of options on the basis of the choice set that they face, and sample from that
distribution. This assumption resonates with much existing literature. For example, Kamenica
(2008) presents a model in which choosers infer that choice options reflect the preferences of
the population, and thereby explains choice overload effects. In consumer psychology it also
been suggested that people treat choice options as informative about the marketplace, as when a
medium-height person will rationally choose a sweatshirt size near the middle of the available
range of size options (Prelec et al., 1997; Simonson, 2008; Wernerfelt, 1995). Results from
cognitive psychology suggest that people update their estimates about quantities such as market
prices on the basis of experimentally-provided options, particularly when initial uncertainty is
high (Shenoy and Yu, 2013; Sher and McKenzie, 2014).
To link our model with the classical utility paradigm, we note here that features of the
classical utility approach are obtained as a limiting case of MADS: If individuals’ sampling
distributions do not depend on the choice sets they face and the number of samples approaches
infinity, then choices are deterministic, consistent across contexts and the context effects are
6not predicted.
We now provide an intuitive introduction to the model and illustrate how it accounts for the
attraction, compromise and similarity effects. Faced with a choice set, an individual draws a
finite sample of n items to mind. The distribution from which the n items are drawn is assumed
to be systematically influenced by the set of choice options. Each choice alternative is then
compared to the other choice alternatives and to the items in the sample, accruing a point for
every one that it dominates. The alternative with the highest score is then selected.1 Consider
the choice set {A,B} in Figure II. The shaded area represents the distribution over the whole
marketplace of options from which the individual draws a sample of size n. Each of the n
comparison items increases the probability of choosing A, the probability of choosing B, or
neither. The effect of a comparator will depend on where in the price × quality space it falls.
Consider the regions marked RA, RB, and RAB. RB is the dominance region exclusive to
option B, which we refer to as B’s solo-dominance region. Any item that falls within RB is
more expensive than both A and B, lower quality than B, and higher quality than A. Thus
B dominates any item in RB. Items in RB are more expensive but also higher quality than
option A, so they are not dominated by A. Similarly, comparison items that fall in RA are
dominated exclusively by A. Finally, items that fall in RAB are dominated by both A and B
so RAB is referred to as a joint-dominance region. MADS assumes that choice is determined
by how many comparison items fall into each of these regions. The distribution from which
comparison items are drawn will therefore affect whether A or B is chosen. A larger portion
of the shaded area falls into RA than RB, meaning that A is more likely to be chosen. Note
that because of the probabilistic nature of the sampling process, A will not always be chosen,
especially if the comparison sample is small, leading to a stochastic element of choice in our
model.2
[Figure II about here.]
MADS assumes that an alternative accrues a point when an item falls in its solo-dominance
region. For items in a joint-dominance region, a point accrues to any of the dominating alter-
natives’ scores with equal probability. Therefore, if there are no dominance relations between
the alternatives in the choice set, the alternative with the highest probability of accumulating a
7point is also the most likely to be chosen. The model provides analytic expressions for the prob-
abilities of choosing each alternative from a choice set, which are provided in the Appendix.
An illustration of how the sampling distribution is hypothesised to depend on the attraction
effect choice sets is given by Figure III. The triangular nature of the attraction effect choice set
pulls more of the density of the sampling distribution to the dominance region of the target (A
in the left panel, B in the right). This increases the probability that comparison items are drawn
from the target’s dominance region. This will tend to increase the score accumulated by the
target relative to the non-target alternative, and hence will increase the probability of it being
chosen. Furthermore, attraction effect choice sets include a dominated alternative which gives
the target a head-start in the accumulation of points.
[Figure III about here.]
The intuition behind the explanation of the compromise effect is illustrated by Figure IV.
It is hypothesised that the central parts of individuals’ sampling distributions are wider. When
the shift in the choice set is accompanied by a corresponding shift of the sampling distribution
as shown, the central alternative remains the most popular: the compromise effect occurs.3
In addition to its solo-dominance region, the target (compromise) alternative enjoys two
joint dominance regions; one with each of the other alternatives.
[Figure IV about here.]
The intuition behind our account of the similarity effect is illustrated by Figure V. The effect
is driven by the fact that the non-target alternative (B in the left panel, A in the right) is forced
to share its solo-dominance region with the decoy. On the other hand, the target alternative is
left with a relatively large solo-dominance region, increasing the probability of it being chosen:
the similarity effect occurs.
[Figure V about here.]
We test the model’s explanation of context effects in two novel experiments. In the first,
we manipulate choice. Individuals were exposed to a selection of items that are dominated by
8some of the choice alternatives in order to influence which items are sampled. The prediction
of MADS was confirmed: Alternatives promoted by our treatment were chosen 22% more
often. We use two-attribute choice items (hotels that vary in price and quality) and find that
the treatment effect can be decomposed as 47% for those participants who reported paying
equal attention to both attributes (the majority), whereas there was no effect for those reporting
unequal attention. Crucially, and as predicted, the choice manipulations impacted the size and
significance of the three classic context effects. Our design included multiple treatments which
allowed us to attempt to enhance and counter the effects. Doing so, we doubled the attraction
effect and then reduced it to be insignificantly different from zero. In other words, the attraction
effect was turned off. The compromise and similarity effects were also significantly impacted,
but by less than the attraction effect was. In particular, the similarity effect was enhanced by
enough to be significantly different from zero, i.e., the similarity effect was turned on.
In a second experiment, we elicited individuals’ sampling distributions. We show that these
distributions depend on the choice faced. Furthermore, the dependence of these distributions
on choice sets is as required for MADS to explain the three context effects. We then examine
individual-level distributions and show that MADS predicts the choices in most of our condi-
tions. We also estimate the model’s central parameter: the number of comparison items brought
to mind. We find this to be four, which is a psychologically realistic value for the capacity of
human working memory (Cowan, 2001).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section II we present the model along
with sufficient conditions on the sampling distribution for MADS to predict the three context
effects. In sections III and IV we report the experimental design and results. Section V provides
a discussion of the model, relates it to other approaches within economics and psychology, and
concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Each x ∈ X is referred to as a choice alternative, and X the choice set. Each choice
alternative is J−dimensional, where x = (x1, ..., xJ) describes the level of each attribute of
alternative x. Given X , the individual samples from a J−dimensional distribution or sampling
9distribution over the product space, with CDF denoted FX . n > 0 draws are made from FX .
For the purposes of this paper we assume draws are independently and identically distributed
and that FX contains no mass points. MADS describes two stages of cognitive processing. In
the first stage, a sample is generated. The set of draws sampled is denoted W where a typical
element is w = (w1, ..., wJ) ∈ W .
In the second stage, a score for each choice alternative is determined and a choice is made.
The score of an alternative x is constructed via ordinal binary comparisons of its attribute levels
against those of other items in the reference set X ∪W , with typical element r = (r1, ..., rJ).
Elements of this set are referred to as comparators or comparison items. A choice alternative
accrues a point when it is compared to an item in the reference set that it dominates. The choice
alternative with the highest total score is then chosen.
To represent the process explicitly, let %j be the rational binary preference relation which
an individual has over levels of the attributes j = 1, . . . , J over any two items. Therefore x
dominates y if x %j y for j = 1, . . . , J .4 In the case of hotels, where the attributes are price (p)
and rating (q), both preference relations are assumed monotonic: x %p y ⇐⇒ xp ≤ yp and
x %q y ⇐⇒ xq ≥ yq. The choice correspondence c : X 7→ X can then be expressed as:
c(X) = arg max
x∈X
{s(x)}
where,
s(x) = |{r ∈ {W ∪X} : A(r) = x}|
A(r) =

one member of DX(r), each selected with probability 1|DX(r)| if DX(r) 6= ∅
∅ else
DX(r) =
{
x ∈ X˜ \ r : x %j r, j = 1, . . . , J
}
X˜ = {x ∈ X : there is no y ∈ X such that y %j x and y 6= x, j = 1, ..., J}
If c(X) is a singleton, then this item is chosen. If it contains more than one element, then
each element of the set is chosen with equal probability. In this notation, X˜ is the set of
undominated alternatives in the choice set. DX(r) is the set of choice alternatives in X˜ that
dominate r (excluding comparison with itself), A(r) is the alternative that accumulates a point
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from comparison item r, and s(x) is the total score accumulated for each choice alternative.
We now provide sufficient conditions on the sampling distributions required for MADS to
predict each of the three context effects. We provide sufficient conditions under an assumption
of symmetry between the sampling distributions across the two choice sets of each context
effect, which provides a clean statement for how the model can generate the effects. The
symmetry conditions state that the probability of sampling an item which affects the expected
scores of A and B by the same amount, across the different choice sets, is the same. If this
condition is satisfied, one can focus on the probabilities of items falling in regions that affect
the difference in the scores.
More general conditions, which allow for a relaxation of symmetry, are still expressible
analytically, but no longer have the simplicity of those in Propositions 1-3 as they require
conditions quantifying the asymmetry and on n. Where data do not satisfy symmetry, the full
expressions for choice probabilities can be used directly to check when the context effects are
expected, and these are provided in the Appendix.
With symmetry assumed, we now reveal the simple conditions driving our intuition that are
required for the sampling distributions to produce the effects. Figs. III-V are the counterparts
of the Propositions below which display distributions that satisfy the conditions, where for ease
of reference, one can suppose that shaded areas represents a uniform density, integrating to one.
Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Denote the probability of a sampled comparison item being dominated by an alternative x
having been presented with choice set X , as FX(x). Furthermore, let F{A,B,DA} and F{A,B,DB}
be denoted byA andB respectively, where DA and DB are the decoys making A and B the tar-
gets respectively and where the exact positioning of the decoy depends on which context effect
is in question. This means for example, that A(B) is the probability of a sampled item falling
in the solo-dominance region of B from the sampling distribution induced by {A,B,DA}.
For joint dominance regions, we analogously denote A(A,B) (B(A,B)) as the probability of
drawing a n item which is dominated by both A and B from the sampling distribution induced
by {A,B,DA} ({A,B,DB}).
Proposition 1 (Attraction). The model produces the attraction effect if:
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(i) Symmetry: A(A,B) = B(A,B), A(A) = B(B) and A(B) = B(A).
(ii)
A(A)
A(B)
[
=
B(B)
B(A)
]
> 1.
Condition (ii) states that the probability of an item falling in the solo-dominance region
of the target is greater than the probability of an item falling in the solo-dominance region of
the non-target alternative. This implies it is more likely that the target accumulates a point.
Because the item with the highest score is chosen, the attraction effect results.
Proposition 2 (Compromise). The model produces the compromise effect if the following are
satisfied:
(i) Symmetry: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = A(CA) = B(A) = B(CB), A(A,B) = A(A,CA) =
B(A,B) = B(B,CB) and A(A,B,CA) = B(A,B,CB).
(ii)
A(A) + 1
2
A(A,B) + 1
2
A(A,CA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B)
[
=
B(B) + 1
2
B(A,B) + 1
2
B(B,CB)
A(B) + 1
2
A(A,B)
]
> 1.
The conditionB(B)+1
2
B(A,B)+1
2
B(B,CB) > A(B)+
1
2
A(A,B) says that the probability
of a point being accumulated to B’s score is higher under {A,B,CB} than {A,B,CA} i.e.,
p(B|ABCB) > p(B|ABCA), the compromise effect. Note that if B’s solo-dominance region
is larger when it is the target it helps to produce the effect. Notice also, that when B is the
target, it has two joint-dominance regions, but it has only one when it is not the target. This
accounts for the presence of an extra joint-dominance region in the numerator of (ii). A similar
argument can be made for A.
Proposition 3 (Similarity). The model produces the similarity effect if the following are satis-
fied:
(i) Symmetry: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A), A(SA) = B(SB), A(A, SA) = B(B, SB),
A(B, SA) = B(A, SB) and A(A,B, SA) = B(A,B, SB).
(ii)
A(A) + 1
2
A(A, SA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A, SB)
[
=
B(B) + 1
2
B(B, SB)
A(B) + 1
2
A(B, SA)
]
> 1.
The condition B(B) + 1
2
B(B, SB) > A(B) +
1
2
A(B, SA) says that the probability of B
accruing a point is higher when {A,B, SB} is the choice set, than when {A,B, SA} is. Hence
(ii) is sufficient to yield p(B|ABSB) > p(B|ABSA), the similarity effect. By inspection of
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Figure V one can see that B(B) is likely to be greater than A(B) due to the configuration of
the similarity effect choice sets. Although A(B, SA) is also likely to be greater than B(B, SB),
these joint-dominance regions only have a probability of 1
2
of adding to B’s score. A similar
argument can be made for A.
The symmetry conditions of Propositions 1-3 suppose that individuals’ sampling distribu-
tions will depend on the relative position of the choice set’s alternatives to each other, but will
otherwise be the same, i.e., will not depend on the absolute levels of the attributes. Assuming
symmetry allows for a clear exposition, permitting explanations to rely on a ratio consisting of
a few areas of the sampling distribution’s density. We consider it a natural benchmark case,
especially for markets where individuals have had no prior experience. In practice, when indi-
viduals are evaluating items, they will draw not only on the choice set presented to them, but
also on their prior experience or knowledge of the product. This can also be expected to af-
fect their sampling distribution. For hotels, for example, if individuals have predominantly had
exposure to cheaper, lower quality hotels than those in the choice sets offered, their sampling
distributions are likely to place more weight on this end of the market. This would cause the
distributions to be asymmetric.
III. EXPERIMENT 1
III.A. Design
Choice alternatives for both experiments were Manhattan hotel stays, for which there are
two main attributes: ‘average rating’ and ‘price’. Data pertaining to real hotels were taken
from Hotels.com on 23 June 2014. We recorded the price and average rating of the cheapest
200 hotel stays for a one-night stay for one adult in one room, for a stay on 12 November
2014. Figure VI provides a plot of the hotel data recorded. ‘Average rating’ refers to the
rating given by members of Hotels.com who had previously stayed at the hotel.5 We presented
the score rounded to one decimal place, as it is presented on the website itself. This served
as our proxy for quality, so that we could present data across the price-quality domain, as in
classical context-effect experiments. Given the familiarity of such sites to internet users, we
referred to ‘average rating’ rather than ‘quality’ throughout the experiment. 12 distinct hotels
13
were selected from these data to form the six choice sets of the three context effects, shown in
Table I. As with most studies showing the presence of these context effects, participants’ hotel
choices were hypothetical.
[Figure VI about here.]
[Table I about here.]
1,304 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers were recruited in July 2014. It was de-
cided in advance that 1,200 participants would be tested; 1,300 were requested from AMT in
order to be able to remove some if there were those who had completed a related pilot, and
1,304 were received. There is considerable variation in the size of context effects in the litera-
ture, and they are of course not always found (Trueblood et al., 2015). Estimates from studies
in consumer choice find sizes ranging from about 0.15 (see Table 1 of Trueblood et al. 2013)
to over 0.3 (Noguchi and Stewart 2014). We chose to ensure 100 participants per condition;
this gives a power of 0.8 to detect a difference in choice proportion of 0.2 when comparing two
conditions with each other.
We excluded 68 participants from the analysis because they had previously completed a
related pilot study; one was removed because they did not complete the experiment. This
left data from 1,235 participants for analysis. Average completion time was 14 minutes 27
seconds. Participants were compensated with a participation fee of $1.50, which corresponds to
an average hourly wage of $6.23. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions
= 3 [attraction, compromise, similarity] ×2 [A target, B target] = 6 choice sets ×2 conditions
[treatment, control].
Participants in the treatment condition each saw data relating to ten hotels taken from the
dataset before selecting an alternative from one of the six choice sets. They were shown the
price and average rating of each of these ten hotels one at a time, and for each one were asked
to indicate on a seven-point scale how likely they would be to stay at the hotel. The purpose of
asking this was to ensure some amount of engagement with the hotels presented, such that they
would affect the hotels available in the participants’ comparison sample. An example screen-
shot is provided in Figure VII. Following the treatment, participants faced one of the choice sets
14
and answered the question “Which hotel would you be most likely to choose?”. Participants in
the control condition simply chose without seeing any other hotels first. Participants were also
then asked to indicate how they divided their attention when considering hotel choices using a
seven-point scale where 1 meant “considered solely prices”, 4 meant “both attributes equally”,
and 7 “solely ratings”. Before finishing, participants faced a series of questions for another
experiment. Basic demographic questions followed on the final screen.
[Figure VII about here.]
The ten hotels shown in the treatment condition were chosen from our data shown in Fig-
ure VI such that they were dominated by alternative B (the more expensive, higher-quality
alternative), but not dominated by alternative A (the cheaper, lower-quality alternative), in the
choice set they faced afterwards. Because the hotels in each context effect choice set were
different, a different set of hotels was used as a manipulation for each choice set. Where there
were more than ten candidate hotels fitting this description, ten were chosen at random. Every
participant in the same choice set saw the same ten hotels, but in a random order. The manip-
ulation is described by Figure VIII. Notice that in the attraction and compromise choice sets,
only alternative B is promoted. In the similarity set including a decoy close to B, both B and
the decoy are promoted, because they are close together. We now refer to the target alternatives
in general as the manipulation targets.
[Figure VIII about here.]
III.B. Choice and context effect manipulation
The treatment effect is the difference in the proportion of participants choosing the ma-
nipulation targets in the treatment and control conditions. Overall, the proportion of times
participants chose the manipulation targets was 22% higher following the treatment.
Our theory supposes that this manipulation will be successful because the hotels that par-
ticipants were shown are dominated by the manipulation targets on both attributes, but by the
other alternatives in the choice set on only one attribute. Therefore, we expect to the manipula-
tion to have the most impact when individuals pay attention to both attributes. Table II shows
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large differences in manipulation effect depending on whether or not participants paid attention
to both attributes equally. The majority of participants paid attention to both attributes equally.
The effect of the treatment on these participants was 17% (p < .001) corresponding to a rela-
tive increase of 47% in the proportion choosing the manipulation targets, but was zero for those
reporting that they paid attention unequally.
[Table II about here.]
MADS is intentionally as simple as possible, and implicitly assumes that participants pay
equal attention to both dimensions.6 We therefore continue the analysis using data from partic-
ipants who reported paying equal attention to both dimensions. As noted above, the manipula-
tions had a significant and large impact on choice for these participants.7
Our design permits us to attempt to counter and enhance the three context effects. For ex-
ample, the attraction effect says that alternative B will be chosen more often from {A,B, TB}
than {A,B, TA}, with no manipulation. When participants choosing from {A,B, TA} are in-
stead in the treatment condition, we predict that B will be more popular than if they were not.
Therefore, when we compare choices from participants who faced {A,B, TB} in the control
and {A,B, TA} in the treatment group, we predict that the attraction effect will be reduced.
This example corresponds to the first column in Figure IX. The remaining columns describe
which data from which conditions are compared to investigate the impact on the context effects.
[Figure IX about here.]
We know from Table II that the manipulations had a significant impact on choices. The
manipulation effect is still significant when broken down by context effect (all three χ2 tests
give p < .001). Figure X shows how choice manipulations in turn affected the presence and
strength of the attraction, compromise and similarity effects.
[Figure X about here.]
The attraction effect was replicated with an effect of .34, significantly different from zero.8
When we enhanced the context effect through our manipulation, the effect size almost doubled,
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to .65. When we countered the effect, the effect fell to .07, which is insignificantly different
from zero. In other words, the attraction effect was turned off. The compromise effect was
.38, significantly different from zero. Countering the compromise effect reduced it to .31 and
enhancing lifted it to .43.
The similarity effect was not replicated, with an effect insignificantly different from zero.
Our theory dictates that the presence of context effects are probabilistic and we are not the first
study to find that the similarity effect is the weakest (e.g., Noguchi and Stewart, 2014).9 More
importantly, our manipulations did have an effect. Countering the similarity effect pushed the
size down to -.15, which is marginally significant (p = .07), which shows some evidence of
reversing the effect. When we enhanced the effect, the size became .20, which is significantly
different from zero. In other words, the similarity effect was turned on.
IV. EXPERIMENT 2
IV.A. Design
607 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers were recruited. The participants of experiment 2
were also the control group for experiment 1. Following their choice, and hence exposure to a
choice set, we elicited what participants inferred about the rest of the hotel market. It would
have been infeasible to ask them for their best guess of all the other 197 hotels in our dataset.
Instead we asked them to estimate the price and quality of a randomly chosen 20. They were
told that 20 hotels had been randomly selected from our dataset, which they had to estimate.
These 20 did not include the three they had already seen in their choice set. Participants were
able to see their choice set throughout the elicitation process, but not to change their choice.
To elicit their estimation of the market distribution, they completed two screens. On the
second screen, we asked participants to plot where they thought these 20 hotels lay in price ×
rating space, based on the choice set they had seen. That is, they were shown their choice set
plotted on a pair of axes and required to plot where they thought the 20 additional hotels were
located. An example screen-capture is provided in Figure XI. The example participant shown
chose from a similarity effect choice set, {A,B, SA}, which typically promotes the cheapest
option A (labelled in the figure for the benefit of the reader). The participant has placed nine
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plots so far. The choice set was displayed in red; plots in green. To avoid possible anchoring
effects, we did not include grid lines, axis ticks or axis-tick labels. To scale the axes, we
asked for their best guess of the minimum and maximum price and average rating of the 23
hotels (including the choice set they faced). The minimum and maximum value of each axis
was determined by participants themselves on the first screen, which they could not return to.
Illogical answers e.g., that the minimum was higher than the maximum, were not allowed. The
on-screen size of the plotter was fixed to be a square; participants only determined the scale of
the axes. Participants were able to see the coordinates where their mouse was hovering, were
able to remove the points they had plotted and start again by ‘resetting’ the graph and were
provided with a counter telling them how many points they still had to place.
[Figure XI about here.]
We did not allow participants to go back to change the minimum and maximum values for
the axes due to concerns that participants would tweak their answers to move their choice set
around the plotter. We removed data of participants who entered values extreme enough such
that the choice set would be shown bunched into the corner of the screen.10 We chose the cut-
off to be a price of $800; anyone entering this value or higher was excluded. This removed 35
participants, leaving 572 for analysis.
As an incentive payment, participants were told that the five who plotted closest to the 20
hotels would be paid $5 as a bonus. The procedure we used to determine who was the closest
was the modified-Hausdorff metric, as advocated by Dubuisson and Jain (1994). This metric
provides a distance based on the average minimum pairwise distances between two sets of
coordinates. In our case, these two sets were the participant’s plotted data, and the 20 hotels
randomly chosen. Participants were not told the details of the metric; they were simply told
that the five participants whose plots were ‘closest’ to the 20 we had would be paid.
IV.B. Aggregate distribution elicitation
Each panel of Figure XII presents the pooled plots placed by all ≈100 participants per
choice set, meaning there are roughly 2,000 plots in each panel. We provide the proportions
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of plots contained within the crucial areas identified by theory. We draw on patterns in these
aggregate data which illustrate how choice sets affect distributions and that these distributions
move in ways compatible with our theory to produce the context effects. We discuss features of
this aggregate distribution data as if it were in fact the distribution of all individuals in order to
demonstrate how we consider context effects can arise. The individual-level data are explored
in the next section.
[Figure XII about here.]
Recall that MADS supposes that movements in the sampling distributions change the prob-
abilities of alternatives being included in the comparison set, and hence affect choice probabil-
ities. Firstly, we test whether in fact there has been any difference in the distributions elicited
across the choice sets for each context effect. Casual inspection of the heat-maps suggests
pronounced movement of the density of the plotted points between choice sets. Using a multi-
dimensional version of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, as proposed by Fasano and Franceschini
(1987), we found that within each of the three context effects the distributions elicited from
participants differed significantly (p < .001) depending on which choice set they had seen. We
now turn to see whether the movements of these aggregate data coincide with MADS’s account
of the context effects.
The attraction effect panels show the density of the two solo-dominance regions in each con-
dition that determine the choice probabilities. Comparing left ({A,B, TA}) to right ({A,B, TB}):
.05 of the density shifts from A’s dominance region when A is the target to B’s dominance re-
gion when B is the target. This shift in density means that according to MADS, A has a higher
chance of accumulating a point on the left, and B a higher chance on the right. In turn, this
implies A has a higher probability of being chosen from {A,B, TA} than {A,B, TB}, and sim-
ilarly B from {A,B, TB} than {A,B, TA}: the attraction effect. The fact that the target enjoys
a 1-0 head-start in the score accumulation from the decoy only serves to strengthen the effect.
In the compromise effect panels, the total density in the solo and two-way-joint dominance
regions is shown. These are the regions that determine the ranking of the probabilities of the
three choice alternatives accumulating a point. In the left panel ({A,B,CA}) these regions give
A an approximate .09+ 1
2
(.02+ .03) = .115 probability of accumulating a point, .06+ 1
2
(.03) =
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.075 for B and .06 + 1
2
(.02) = .07 for CA. Similarly in the right panel ({A,B,CB}), the
regions give the probability of A, B and CB accruing a point respectively as approximately
.08, .095, .085. As A is the most likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but the least likely
when B is, its probability of being chosen is > 1
3
and < 1
3
in the two conditions respectively.
Similarly, asB is the most likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but approximately joint-
least likely when A is, its probability of being chosen is > 1
3
and < 1
3
in the two conditions
respectively. AsA is chosen more often in {A,B,CA} than in {A,B,CB} andB more often in
{A,B,CB} than in {A,B,CA}, MADS predicts the compromise effect would arise with these
aggregate data.
In the similarity effect panels, the two regions that affect the relative scores of the choice
alternatives that have a non-negligibly small amount of density are shown. In the left panel
({A,B, SA}) these regions give the probability of A, B and SA accruing a point respectively
as approximately .09, .05, .05. Similarly in the right panel ({A,B, SB}), the regions give the
probability of A, B and SB accruing a point respectively as approximately .045, .12, .045. As
A is the most likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but the joint-least likely when B is,
its probability of being chosen is > 1
3
and < 1
3
in the two conditions respectively. Similarly,
as B is the most likely to accrue a point when it is the target, but joint-least likely when A
is, its probability of being chosen is > 1
3
and < 1
3
in the two conditions respectively. As A is
chosen more often in {A,B, SA} than in {A,B, SB} and B more often in {A,B, SB} than in
{A,B, SA}, MADS predicts the similarity effect would arise with these aggregate data.
IV.C. Individual-level estimation results
Finally, we examined whether it was possible to predict individuals’ choices. Our model
imposes no assumptions or parameters on an individual’s sampling distribution, but with only
20 plots per participant, empirical distributions at the individual level are too coarse to enable
prediction. Therefore, we selected the multi-variate distribution that best-fitted each partici-
pant’s plots (i.e., selection was independent of the choice data). Various copulas (Gaussian,
t, Frank, Gumbel and Clayton) were fitted to each participant’s estimate of the distribution of
23 points (20 plotted and 3 from their choice set).11 Copula selection for each participant was
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determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. For each participant we then identified the
choice that was most likely on the basis of that participant’s estimated sampling distribution.
The proportion of correct predictions is reported in Table III. It can be seen that the choices were
reasonably well predicted for participants in the attraction and compromise conditions but not
in the similarity conditions. These findings are congruent with the fact that we replicated the
attraction and compromise effects but not the similarity effect, as shown in Figure X.
[Table III about here.]
To compute the estimates of Table III, it was necessary to estimate the MADS parameter n,
which specifies the number of comparison items brought to mind from individuals’ sampling
distributions. We calculated the probability of participants’ choice data for different values of n
and found the maximum likelihood estimate to be 4.12 The estimate is precise in the sense that
it is different from both 3 and 5 (LR tests p = .021 and p = .091 respectively). We emphasise
that n = 4 is a psychologically realistic value for working memory capacity (see Cowan, 2001),
consistent with the idea that comparison samples are held in working memory during choice.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
MADS offers a single-mechanism model of the attraction, compromise and similarity ef-
fects. Two experiments tested the assumptions of the model. In Experiment 1, prior exposure to
a selection of market options altered subsequent choices in ways predicted by the model, and al-
lowed us to reduce and enhance the ‘big three’ context effects documented in consumer choice.
Experiment 2 demonstrated that individuals’ sampling distributions of market options depend
on the choice set in ways required for the model to produce the effects. These results, consistent
with recent psychological studies of risky choice (e.g., Stewart et al., 2015, Ungemach et al.,
2011) but here pertaining to the classic context effects, suggests that assumptions about back-
ground distributions, combined with choices made on the basis of simple dominance relations,
can give rise to context effects. Moreover, the maximum likelihood estimator of the model’s
central parameter for the number of comparator items sampled took on a psychologically real-
istic value for the capacity of human working memory.
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Our data were generated by members of Amazon’s online platform, Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT). AMT’s participant population has been shown to have the advantages of being
more demographically diverse, and producing data of a comparable quality to more traditional
participant methods (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Chandler et al., 2014). This has been shown
through many studies replicating classic experiments in various domains including cognitive
psychology (e.g., Paolacci et al., 2010, Goodman et al., 2013) and economics (e.g., Horton
et al., 2011). Some have expressed concern that AMT participants may not pay sufficient
attention to the choice alternatives which may lead to a failure to find the attraction effect
(Simonson, 2014). However, we demonstrate that the classic context effects in consumer choice
can be found with such samples.
Our approach is rooted in and brings together various approaches within cognitive sci-
ence, consumer psychology and economics. In economics, some recent theoretical approaches
have been developed to show how anomalous choice behaviours can be explained by cognitive
limitations such as binary ordinal comparison (e.g., Kornienko, 2013), memory limitations in
forecasting (Mullainathan, 2002), psychological salience (Bordalo et al., 2012b, 2013) or as
optimal responses to noise (e.g., Robson, 2001; Steiner and Stewart, 2015). Our approach falls
within this tradition and also draws on information-sampling models of judgement, most of
which assume that judgements are typically made on the basis of limited samples (e.g., Fiedler,
2000; Fiedler and Juslin, 2006; Fiedler and Kareev, 2006; Lindskog et al., 2013). Relevant
alternatives are assumed typically to be retrieved from memory as well as, or instead of, being
sampled from the choice context (for a related approach within economics, see Gennaioli and
Shleifer, 2010). More specifically, our model can be seen as an extension of rank-based mod-
els such as Decision by Sampling (Stewart et al., 2006) and, more generally, sampling models
that assume options are evaluated relative to an assumed background distribution (see also Ko-
rnienko, 2013). Related to suggestions in economics (Kamenica, 2008), marketing (Wernerfelt,
1995) and cognitive psychology (Shenoy and Yu, 2013; Sher and McKenzie, 2014), MADS as-
sumes that people’s inferences about the relevant background distributions are influenced by
the context of choice options. MADS however, both extends Decision by Sampling to the
multi-dimensional case (see also Stewart and Simpson, 2008), and specifies the role of choice
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options in causing the background distribution to be updated.
MADS makes the same predictions as the classical utility paradigm as a limiting case: If
we allow the number of samples to approach infinity and assume individuals’ sampling dis-
tributions do not depend on the choice sets they face, then choices become deterministic are
context independent and the context effects are not predicted.
Our approach differs from those found in both economics and psychology. Initial explana-
tions within psychology focused on one or two of the context effects at a time, making reference
to decision strategies such as elimination-by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) or concepts such as loss
aversion (Simonson and Tversky, 1992, 1993). Since then, process models have typically had
difficulty in accounting for all three effects within a unifying framework without resorting to
arguably ad hoc parameters or separate mechanisms in order to capture all three effects simulta-
neously. In Simonson and Tversky (1992, 1993) two concepts are proposed. A tradeoff contrast
operates via either the local context (choice set) or the background context. The introduction
of a dominated alternative then enhances the relative tradeoff of attributes of the dominating
alternative, leading to the attraction effect. Extremeness aversion specifies that the absolute
advantages and disadvantages of a choice option (relative to the other options) are weighed by
a loss-averse decision maker. A compromise (middle) alternative would then notch up smaller
losses through comparison to the other choice options, whereas extreme alternatives suffer from
larger losses, leading to the compromise effect. In other models, attraction and compromise ef-
fects are attributed to loss aversion e.g., in the Leaking Competing Accumulators model (Usher
and McClelland, 2004) or attention switching and mutual inhibition occurring between choice
options in Multi-alternative Decision Field Theory (Roe et al., 2001). Bhatia (2013) proposes
a model in which the accessibility of attributes is determined by the attributes’ associations
with objects of potential choice. More accessible attributes in turn carry higher weight in an
evidence accumulation process. These models, among others, can all account for the three key
context effects. However, in each case the three effects cannot be explained in terms of a sin-
gle mechanism. In Bhatia’s model for example, the three effects can occur simultaneously but
will not do so under all parameter settings. In the Multiattribute Linear Ballistic Accumulator
model (Trueblood et al., 2014), the attraction and compromise effects arise because objects that
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are closer to each other receive larger attention weightings, whereas the similarity effect occurs
when confirmatory evidence is given more weight than disconfirmatory evidence. Finally, in
work regarding judgement rather than consumer choice tasks, Bhatia (2014) investigates the
role of confirmatory search processes in explaining the attraction effect. He finds increased re-
trieval of cues favouring the target option when a decoy is present, and that the attraction effect
can be removed by manipulating the availability of relevant cues. Our model is similar in spirit
in that the proportion of ‘cues’ (or ‘sampled items’ in our case) that favour the target alterna-
tive is influenced by the choice set. However, MADS differs in that it is built to model choice
rather than judgement, and in that it is more general e.g., applying also to the compromise and
similarity effects.
The models developed within economics also do not generally offer an account of all three
effects. However, in the models that offer explanations of the attraction (and some also the
compromise) effect, there is a recurring emphasis on dominance comparisons, which resonates
with our approach. In a model of limited attention, Masatlioglu et al. (2012) suggest that the
attraction effect reveals that the target alternative only enters the consideration set when the
dominated decoy is present. Ok et al. (2015) show how dominated choice alternatives can
endogenously act as reference points and constrain the consideration set to include only the
dominating alternatives, leading to the attraction effect. Taking a Bayesian approach, Natenzon
(2016) supposes that decision-makers receive information about their preferences when they
inspect the alternatives in the choice set, forming posterior beliefs over various possible under-
lying stable preference orderings. In this model, it is posited that dominance relations make
for a simple comparison and so emphasise dominant options, leading to the attraction effect.
Furthermore, he shows that if the precision of signals about the decision-maker’s utility are
sufficiently low, the compromise effect is predicted. The model we develop drops the classical
economic assumption of a stable underlying preference ordering, nesting it as an extreme case.
Instead, MADS relies on simple binary dominance relations, limited sampling and systematic
changes in sampling distribution in order to allow the context to determine preferences.13
As a result of these features, MADS contrasts strongly with other models of context effects
developed in economics. Unlike the model of Bordalo et al. (2013), accords no role to salience
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per se. Bordalo et al. assume that greater weight is assigned to attribute values that are more
distant from the average value on that attribute. Although we found no need to include salience
in our model, we note that the Bordalo et al. approach resonates with Helson’s (1964) Adapta-
tion Level Theory, according to which the subjective magnitude of an attribute value increases
with the instance of that attribute value from some of the central tendency of contextual stimuli.
In psychology, however, the experimental program initiated by Parducci (Parducci et al., 1960;
Parducci and Perrett, 1971) and his colleagues largely discredited Adaptation Level Theory,
instead finding effects only of range and relative rank. Moreover, psychological models of dis-
tinctiveness (which is akin to the concept of salience) in memory and identification have found
that the distinctiveness of an item is determined by the difference between the attribute value of
that item and the attribute values of similar items (e.g., Brown et al., 2007). Of course, caution
is needed in relating models of subjective magnitude judgement to models of choice. Nonethe-
less, we emphasise that MADS is built from the ground up to be consistent with plausible
psychological processing principles.
A number of economic models assign a key role to the differential weighting of consump-
tion dimensions that may result from changes in the choice context. For example, Bushong
et al. (2015) assume that a dimension is weighted less when the range of values on that dimen-
sion (from worst to best) increases. The focusing model of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) assumes
in contrast that greater weight is assigned to dimensions on which choice options exhibit more
variation. As Bushong et al. note, range-based models have no natural way to incorporate
compromise effects without augmentation. Moreover, other more general considerations may
be thought to militate against range-based dimensional weighting models. First, Wedell has
argued in a number of papers (e.g., Wedell, 1991; Wedell and Pettibone, 1996; Wedell, 1998)
against the idea that simple context effects of the type discussed here reflect changes in the
weighting of relevant dimensions (although we note Bushong et al.’s observation that weighting
may become increasingly important as the number of potentially relevant dimensions increases
beyond the two that we consider here). More generally, psychophysical research on the subject
of judgement of magnitudes has shown that the perceived magnitude of an attribute value (and
hence the perceived difference between attribute values) is influenced not just by the range of
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contextual stimuli, but also by the relative ranked position that each attribute value occupies
within a comparison context. As noted in the introduction, a considerable body of empirical
evidence is consistent with this assumption. Moreover, there have been recent suggestions that
apparent range effects may really be ‘rank effects in disguise’ (Brown and Matthews, 2011;
Brown et al., 2015). MADS, with its assumption that binary ordinal comparisons form the ba-
sis of choice, aligns closely to this tradition of research. Indeed, the ordinal comparisons that
MADS assumes are precisely the same as those that are assumed to underpin judgement and
choice in psychological process models such as Decision by Sampling (Stewart et al., 2006).
We therefore view MADS as aligning more closely with a range of psychological evidence than
do range-based models.
We have focused on possibly the three most widely discussed context effects in the litera-
ture. Finally, we note here that MADS is able to capture more. Firstly, another documented con-
text effect is the ‘phantom decoy’ effect (Pratkanis and Farquhar, 1992; Pettibone and Wedell,
2000, 2007). There, the decoy option (which is unavailable for choice) dominates one alter-
native (the target) but not the other (non-target). The effect is present when the target’s choice
share is higher than the non-target’s. MADS predicts the effect when the decoy changes the
sampling distribution over the product space in such a way that the target’s dominance region
increases by more than the non-target’s region. As the decoy is typically close to the target,
we consider it realistic that this area of the inferred distribution would be inflated, leading to
an increase in the choice share of the target relative to the non-target. Secondly, Teppan and
Felfernig (2009) find that the attraction effect can be offset by introducing two decoys to a bi-
nary choice set A,B, one dominated by A only, one by B only. MADS naturally predicts this
to happen: the sampling distribution would plausibly be pulled down approximately equally by
both decoys, giving A and B a more equal share of the density in their solo-dominance regions
compared to a less equal share following an attraction effect choice set, when only one of these
decoys is present.
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APPENDIX
Let A and B denote the sampling distributions given choice sets F{A,B,TA} and F{A,B,TB}
respectively. Also recall that we have assumed i.i.d. draws from sampling distributions. The
probability of choosing x from X is denoted p(x|X). In equations, choice sets are written
without braces or commas to save on the width of the text. To simplify the expressions, instead
of using the sampling distribution directly, we use the probability of a choice alternative accu-
mulating a point relative to other choice alternatives. These are denoted α(x) and β(x) given
choice sets {A,B,DA} and {A,B,DB} respectively. n > 0 is assumed, but in some instances
n = 1 would cause a summand to be invalid, in those cases, the sum is zero.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Firstly we define the probability of choice alternatives A, B and neither accruing a point:
α(A) = A(A) + 1
2
A(A,B) β(A) = B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B)
α(B) = A(B) + 1
2
A(A,B) β(B) = B(B) + 1
2
B(A,B)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B) β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABTA) =1
2
bn−12 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k + 1, n− 2k − 1
)
α(A)kα(B)k+1αn−2k−10
+
n∑
k1=0
min {k1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2αn−k1−k20
p(A|ABTB) =1
2
bn−12 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k + 1, n− 2k − 1
)
β(B)kβ(A)k+1βn−2k−10
+
n∑
k1=2
min {k1−2,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2βn−k1−k20
Denote p and p¯ as a lower bound for p(A|ABTA) and an upper bound for p(A|ABTB) respec-
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tively, hence p > p¯ =⇒ p(A|ABTA) > p(A|ABTB), the attraction effect:
p =
n∑
k1=1
min {k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2(1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2
p¯ =
n∑
k1=1
min {k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2(1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
so p > p¯ if for k1 > k2:
α(A)k1α(B)k2(1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2 > β(A)k1β(B)k2(1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
and if A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A) and A(A,B) = B(A,B) this simplifies to
(1)
[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1.
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for p(B|ABTB) and p(B|ABTA)
gives the same expression. When in addition one lets α(A)
α(B)
[
= β(B)
β(A)
]
> 1, (1) is satisfied as
k1 > k2. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
α(A) = A(A) + 1
2
(A(A,B) +A(A,CA)) +
1
3
A(A,B,CA) β(A) = B(A) +
1
2
B(A,B) + 1
3
B(A,B,CB)
α(B) = A(B) + 1
2
A(A,B) + 1
3
A(A,B,CA) β(B) = B(B) +
1
2
(B(A,B) + B(B,CB)) +
1
3
B(A,B,CB)
α(CA) = A(CA) +
1
2
A(A,CA) +
1
3
A(A,B,CA) β(CB) = B(CB) +
1
2
B(B,CB) +
1
3
B(A,B,CB)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B)− α(CA) β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)− β(CB)
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABCA) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
α(A)kα(B)kα(CA)
kαn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k1α(CA)
k2αn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(CA)
k1αn−2k1−k20
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+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(CA)
k3αn−k1−k2−k30
p(A|ABCB) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
β(A)kβ(B)kβ(CB)
kβn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k1β(CB)
k2βn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(CB)
k1βn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(CB)
k3βn−k1−k2−k30
We make the following symmetry assumptions: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = A(CA) = B(A) =
B(CB), A(A,B) = A(A,CA) = B(A,B) = B(B,CB) and A(A,B,CA) = B(A,B,CB).
Together these imply α(A) = β(B), α(B) = β(A), α(CA) = β(CB) and α0 = β0. Under
these assumptions, notice that p(A|ABCA) > p(A|ABCB) (the compromise effect) is found
if:
[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1.(2)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for p(B|ABCB) and p(B|ABCA)
gives the same expression. Finally, by symmetry,
A(A) + 1
2
A(A,B) + 1
2
A(A,CA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B)
> 1 =⇒ α(A)
α(B)
> 1 =⇒ (2) holds as k1 > k2. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
α(A) = A(A) + 1
2
A(A,SA) +
1
3
A(A,B, SA) β(A) = B(A) +
1
2
B(A,SB) +
1
3
B(A,B, SB)
α(B) = A(B) + 1
2
A(B,SA) +
1
3
A(A,B, SA) β(B) = B(B) +
1
2
B(B,SB) +
1
3
B(A,B, SB)
α(SA) = A(SA) +
1
2
(A(A,SA) +A(B,SA)) +
1
3
A(A,B, SA) β(SB) = B(SB) +
1
2
(B(A,SB) + B(B,SB)) +
1
3
B(A,B, SB)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B)− α(SA) β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)− β(SA)
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These allow us to write:
p(A|ABSA) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
α(A)kα(B)kα(SA)
kαn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k1α(SA)
k2αn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(SA)
k1αn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(SA)
k3αn−k1−k2−k30
p(A|ABSB) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
β(A)kβ(B)kβ(SB)
kβn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k1β(SB)
k2βn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(SB)
k1βn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(SB)
k3βn−k1−k2−k30
We make the following symmetry assumptions: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A), A(SA) =
B(SB), A(A, SA) = B(B, SB), A(B, SA) = B(A, SB) and A(A,B, SA) = B(A,B, SB).
Together these imply α(A) = β(B), α(B) = β(A), α(SA) = β(SB) and α0 = β0. Under these
assumptions, notice that p(A|ABSA) > p(A|ABSB) (the similarity effect) is found if:
[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1.(3)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for p(B|ABSB) and p(B|ABSA)
gives the same expression. Finally, by symmetry,
A(A) + 1
2
A(A, SA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A, SB)
> 1 =⇒ α(A)
α(B)
> 1 =⇒ (3) holds as k1 > k2. 
30
REFERENCES
Aldrovandi S., Wood A.M., Maltby J., Brown G.D.A., 2014. Students’ concern about indebt-
edness: a rank based social norms account. Studies in Higher Education 1–21.
Bachi B., Spiegler R., 2015. Buridanic competition Working paper, Tel Aviv University, Tel
Aviv, Israel.
Berkowitsch N.A., Scheibehenne B., Rieskamp J., 2014. Rigorously testing multialternative
decision field theory against random utility models. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General 143, 1331.
Bhatia S., 2013. Associations and the accumulation of preference. Psychological Review 120,
522–543.
Bhatia S., 2014. Confirmatory search and asymmetric dominance. Journal of Behavioral Deci-
sion Making 27, 468–476.
Bordalo P., Gennaioli N., Shleifer A., 2012a. Salience in experimental tests of the endowment
effect. American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings 102, 47–52.
Bordalo P., Gennaioli N., Shleifer A., 2012b. Salience theory of choice under risk. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 127, 1243–1285.
Bordalo P., Gennaioli N., Shleifer A., 2013. Salience and consumer choice. Journal of Political
Economy 121, 803–843.
Boyce C.J., Brown G.D.A., Moore S.C., 2010. Money and happiness: Rank of income, not
income, affects life satisfaction. Psychological Science 21, 471–475.
Brown G.D.A., Gardner J., Oswald A.J., Qian J., 2008. Does wage rank affect employees’
well-being? Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 47, 355–389.
Brown G.D.A., Matthews W., 2011. Decision by sampling and memory distinctiveness: Range
effects from rank-based models of judgment and choice. Frontiers in Psychology 2, 299.
31
Brown G.D.A., Neath I., Chater N., 2007. A temporal ratio model of memory. Psychological
Review 114, 539–576.
Brown G.D.A., Wood A.M., Ogden R.S., Maltby J., 2015. Do student evaluations of university
reflect inaccurate beliefs or actual experience? A relative rank model. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making 28, 14–26.
Bushong B., Rabin M., Schwartzstein J., 2015. A model of relative thinking Working Paper.
Chandler J., Mueller P., Paolacci G., 2014. Nonnaı¨vete´ among Amazon Mechanical Turk work-
ers: Consequences and solutions for behavioral researchers. Behavior Research Methods 46,
112–130.
Cowan N., 2001. The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental
storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, 87–185.
Doyle J.R., O’Connor D.J., Reynolds G.M., Bottomley P.A., 1999. The robustness of the asym-
metrically dominated effect: Buying frames, phantom alternatives, and in-store purchases.
Psychology & Marketing 16, 225–243.
Dubuisson M.P., Jain A.K., 1994. A modified Hausdorff distance for object matching. In: 12th
International Conference on Pattern Recognition, volume 1, 566–568. IEEE.
Fasano G., Franceschini A., 1987. A multidimensional version of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test. Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 225, 155–170.
Fiedler K., 2000. Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judgment
biases. Psychological Review 107, 659–676.
Fiedler K., Juslin P. (Eds.), 2006. Information sampling and adaptive cognition. Cambridge
University Press.
Fiedler K., Kareev Y., 2006. Does decision quality (always) increase with the size of informa-
tion samples? Some vicissitudes in applying the law of large numbers. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 32, 883–903.
32
Gennaioli N., Shleifer A., 2010. What comes to mind. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125,
1399–1433.
Goodman J.K., Cryder C.E., Cheema A., 2013. Data collection in a flat world: The strengths
and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 26,
213–224.
Helson H., 1964. Adaptation-level theory. New York, USA: Harper & Row.
Hertwig R., Pleskac T.J., 2010. Decisions from experience: Why small samples? Cognition
115, 225–237.
Horton J.J., Rand D.G., Zeckhauser R.J., 2011. The online laboratory: Conducting experiments
in a real labor market. Experimental Economics 14, 399–425.
Huber J., Payne J.W., Puto C., 1982. Adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives: Violations
of regularity and the similarity hypothesis. Journal of Consumer Research 9, 90–98.
Kamenica E., 2008. Contextual inference in markets: On the informational content of product
lines. The American Economic Review 98, 2127–2149.
Ko˝szegi B., Szeidl A., 2013. A model of focusing in economic choice. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 128, 53–104.
Kornienko T., 2013. Nature’s measuring tape: A cognitive basis for adaptive utility. Working
paper, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.
Lindskog M., Winman A., Juslin P., 2013. Naı¨ve point estimation. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 39, 782–800.
Masatlioglu Y., Nakajima D., Ozbay E.Y., 2012. Revealed (p) reference theory. American
Economic Review 102, 2183–2205.
Mellers B.A., 1982. Equity judgment: A revision of Aristotelian views. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: General 111, 242–270.
33
Mullainathan S., 2002. A memory-based model of bounded rationality. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117, 735–774.
Mullett T.L., Tunney R.J., 2013. Value representations by rank order in a distributed network
of varying context dependency. Brain and Cognition 82, 76–83.
Natenzon P., 2016. Random choice and learning Working Paper.
Niedrich R.W., Sharma S., Wedell D.H., 2001. Reference price and price perceptions: A
comparison of alternative models. Journal of Consumer Research 28, 339–354.
Niedrich R.W., Weathers D., Hill R.C., Bell D.R., 2009. Specifying price judgments with
range-frequency theory in models of brand choice. Journal of Marketing Research 46, 693–
702.
Noguchi T., Stewart N., 2014. In the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects, alternatives
are repeatedly compared in pairs on single dimensions. Cognition 132, 44–56.
Ok E.A., Ortoleva P., Riella G., 2015. Revealed (p)reference theory. American Economic
Review 105, 299–321.
Paolacci G., Chandler J., 2014. Inside the turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a participant
pool. Current Directions in Psychological Science 23, 184–188.
Paolacci G., Chandler J., Ipeirotis P.G., 2010. Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Judgment and Decision making 5, 411–419.
Papi M., 2014. Noncompensatory consideration and compensatory choice: An application to
Stackelberg competition. Economic Theory Bulletin 2, 53–63.
Parducci A., Calfee R.C., Marshall L.M., Davidson L.P., 1960. Context effects in judgment:
Adaptation level as a function of the mean, midpoint, and median of the stimuli. Journal of
Experimental Psychology 60, 65–77.
Parducci A., Perrett L.F., 1971. Category rating scales: Effects of relative spacing and fre-
quency of stimulus values. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89, 427–452.
34
Pettibone J.C., Wedell D.H., 2000. Examining models of nondominated decoy effects across
judgment and choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 81, 300–328.
Pettibone J.C., Wedell D.H., 2007. Testing alternative explanations of phantom decoy effects.
Journeal of Behavioral Decision Making 20, 323–341.
Pratkanis A.R., Farquhar P.H., 1992. A brief history of research on phantom alternatives:
Evidence for seven empirical generalizations about phantoms. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology 13, 103–122.
Prelec D., Wernerfelt B., Zettelmeyer F., 1997. The role of inference in context effects: Infer-
ring what you want from what is available. Journal of Consumer Research 24, 118–126.
Riskey D.R., Parducci A., Beauchamp G.K., 1979. Effects of context in judgments of sweetness
and pleasantness. Perception & Psychophysics 26, 171–176.
Robson A.J., 2001. Why would nature give individuals utility functions? Journal of Political
Economy 109, 900–914.
Roe R.M., Busemeyer J.R., Townsend J.T., 2001. Multialternative decision field theory: A
dynamic connectionst model of decision making. Psychological Review 108, 370–392.
Rooderkerk R.P., Van Heerde H.J., Bijmolt T.H., 2011. Incorporating context effects into a
choice model. Journal of Marketing Research 48, 767–780.
Shenoy P., Yu A.J., 2013. Rational preference shifts in multi-attribute choice: What is fair?
Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society .
Sher S., McKenzie C.R.M., 2014. Options as information: Rational reversals of evaluation and
preference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143, 1127–1143.
Simonson I., 1989. Choice based on reasons: The case of attraction and compromise effects.
Journal of Consumer Research 16, 158–174.
Simonson I., 2008. Will I like a ‘medium’ pillow? Another look at constructed and inherent
preferences. Journal of Consumer Psychology 18, 155–169.
35
Simonson I., 2014. Vices and virtues of misguided replications: The case of asymmetric dom-
inance. Journal of Marketing Research 51, 514–519.
Simonson I., Tversky A., 1992. Choice in context: Tradeoff contrast and extremeness aversion.
Journal of Marketing Research 29, 281–295.
Smith R.H., Diener E., Wedell D.H., 1989. Intrapersonal and social comparison determinants
of happiness: A range-frequency analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56,
317–325.
Spiegler R., 2006a. Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations. Theoretical
Economics 1, 207–231.
Spiegler R., 2006b. The market for quacks. Review of Economic Studies 73, 1113–1131.
Steiner J., Stewart C., 2015. Perceiving prospects properly. American Economic Review,
forthcoming .
Stewart N., Chater N., Brown G.D.A., 2006. Decision by sampling. Cognitive Psychology 53,
1–26.
Stewart N., Reimers S., Harris A.J.L., 2015. On the origin of utility, weighting, and discounting
functions: How they get their shapes and how to change their shapes. Management Science
61, 687–705.
Stewart N., Simpson K., 2008. A decision-by-sampling account of decision under risk. In:
N. Chater, M. Oaksford (Eds.), The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive
science. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Teppan E.C., Felfernig A., 2009. Minimization of product utility estimation errors in recom-
mender result set evaluations. In: WI-IAT ’09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM
International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, vol-
ume 1, 20–27. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society.
Trueblood J.S., Brown S.D., Heathcote A., 2014. The multiattribute linear ballistic accumulator
model of context effects in multialternative choice. Psychological Review 121, 179–205.
36
Trueblood J.S., Brown S.D., Heathcote A., 2015. The fragile nature of contextual preference
reversals: Reply to tsetsos, chater, and usher (2015). Psychological Review 122, 848–853.
Trueblood J.S., Brown S.D., Heathcote A., Busemeyer J.R., 2013. Not just for consumers:
Context effects are fundamental to decision making. Psychological Science 24, 901–908.
Tversky A., 1972. Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. Psychological Review 79,
281–299.
Tversky A., Simonson I., 1993. Context-dependent preferences. Management Science 39,
1179–1189.
Ungemach C., Stewart N., Reimers S., 2011. How incidental values from our environment
affect decisions about money, risk, and delay. Psychological Science 22, 253–260.
Usher M., McClelland J.L., 2004. Loss aversion and inhibition in dynamical models of multi-
alternative choice. Psychological Review 111, 757–769.
Wedell D.H., 1991. Distinguishing among models of contextually induced preference reversals.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 17, 767–778.
Wedell D.H., 1998. Testing models of trade-off contrast in pairwise choice. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 24, 49–65.
Wedell D.H., Pettibone J.C., 1996. Using judgments to understand decoy effects in choice.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 67, 326–344.
Wedell D.H., Santoyo E.M., Pettibone J.C., 2005. The thick and the thin of it: Contextual
effects in body perception. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 27, 213–227.
Wernerfelt B., 1995. A rational reconstruction of the compromise effect: Using market data to
infer utilities. Journal of Consumer Research 21, 627–633.
Wood A.M., Brown G.D.A., Maltby J., 2012a. Social norm influences on evaluations of the
risks associated with alcohol consumption: Applying the rank-based decision by sampling
model to health judgments. Alcohol and Alcoholism 47, 57–62.
37
Wood A.M., Brown G.D.A., Maltby J., Watkinson P., 2012b. How are personality judgments
made? A cognitive model of reference group effects, personality scale responses, and behav-
ioral reactions. Journal of Personality 80, 1275–1311.
38
FOOTNOTES
1Note that because there is a finite number of comparison items, whether we use counts or
proportions for value is irrelevant for selecting the highest-value item.
2As n→∞, choice becomes deterministic.
3We consider it plausible that the centre of the sampling distribution may be the widest part.
However, we note this is not a necessary condition for our model to predict the compromise
effect.
4Notice that the probability of sampling a point identical to another is zero because distri-
butions are assumed to have no mass points.
5Each reviewer submits a score of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, where higher numbers correspond to a
better experience. All the hotels we recorded had at least 25 reviews.
6While extensions to the model to account for differential weighting of dimensions are
possible, these involve adding additional parameters and compromise the analytic tractability
of the present concise approach.
7Subsidiary analysis of the choices made by participants who reported paying unequal at-
tention to the two dimensions were as expected: the 73% (56%) who paid more attention to
price (rating) chose the cheapest (highest-rated) of the three options.
8An effect of .34 means that 34% more people chose B from {A,B, TB} than from {A,B, TA}.
9Note that when we looked at individuals’ sampling distributions we did not significantly
predict choice in the similarity effect conditions, but did in the attraction and compromise effect
conditions (see the estimation section).
10Confirming this concern, we were in fact contacted by one participant who had entered a
maximum price of $5,000, who wanted to explain his choice to us.
11Copulas are succinct descriptions of the correlation between two variables.
12Three participants chose the decoy alternative from attraction effect choice sets and were
excluded from the estimation. Our model has no additional error term and so predicts such
behaviour with probability zero, which prevents the likelihood from being well-defined.
13We also note that there is some work in economics on sampling at the intersection of
39
industrial organization and bounded-rationality. Spiegler (2006b) examines the consequences
for a market when it is assumed that consumers sample one item from past experience, and
in Spiegler (2006a), one attribute of a complex product. More recent work has focused on
equilibrium in a market when consumers exhibit some degree of trade-off aversion, employing
some heuristic instead (e.g., Bachi and Spiegler, 2015; Papi, 2014). In particular, Bachi and
Spiegler (2015) study two-attribute goods and assume that a dominant alternative is chosen
when it exists.
TABLES 40
Table I: Choice sets (price in USD, rating).
Alternative Attraction Compromise Similarity
A 125 3.6 179 3.5 194 3.5
B 249 4.4 233 4.0 239 4.2
DA 159 3.3 130 2.9 231 4.1
DB 278 4.1 287 4.5 199 3.6
TABLES 41
Table II: Manipulating choice.
Attribute
attention
Observations χ2 statistic Control Treatment Manipulation
effect
All (1-7) 1,235 9,397,860 .32 .39 .07***
Equal (4) 632 1,286,446 .36 .53 .17***
Non-equal
(1-3, 5-7)
603 0.17 .28 .29 .01***
Attribute attention: sliding scale of integers {1, ..., 7} where 1=only considered price, 4=considered both at-
tributes equally, 7=only considered quality. Manipulation effect: the difference in the percentage of participants
choosing the manipulation targets in the treatment and control conditions. *** denotes a significant difference
from zero, where p < .001 from χ2 tests against the null of no effect. No star denotes p = .681.
TABLES 42
Table III: Predicting individuals’ choices.
Context effect Observations Null Predicted p-value
Attraction 194 .50 .62 .001
Compromise 180 .33 .42 .014
Similarity 198 .33 .30 .327
The null hypotheses are those implied by random prediction between all non-
dominated choice alternatives. p-values are from two-sided binomial tests.
FIGURES 43
Figure I: Context effects
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Hollow dots represent the various decoys that join A and
B to make up ternary context-effect choice sets.
FIGURES 44
Figure II: Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling
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For ease of exposition, assume that the shaded area rep-
resents the support of the sampling distribution. As lower
prices and higher quality are preferred, a point is domi-
nated if it lies to the south-east of another.
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Figure III: Attraction effect
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Figure IV: Compromise effect
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Figure V: Similarity effect
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FIGURES 48
Figure VI: Hotel data.
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FIGURES 49
Figure VII: Screen-shot of Manipulation
Note that the slider was not visible until the participant clicked on the scale.
FIGURES 50
Figure VIII: Manipulating choice: method
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Participants saw ten hotels (crosses) in a random order prior to facing a ternary choice set: A and B
plus one of the decoys (unfilled circles). Notice that in the attraction and compromise choice sets, only
alternative B is promoted. In the similarity set including a decoy close to B, both B and the decoy are
promoted, because they are so close together.
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Figure IX: Manipulating context effects: method.
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In the left (right) three columns, we predict that context effects will be countered (enhanced) due to the manipula-
tion. Choice sets are shown as solid circles and the hotels of the manipulation as crosses. Price is on the x-axis,
average rating on the y-axis.
FIGURES 52
Figure X: Manipulating context effects: evidence.
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Context effect size is the difference in the choice proportions of alternative B. (C) denotes countering
and (E) enhancing where the choice data used for each are depicted in the columns of Figure IX; (N)
denotes ‘neutral’, which refers to the standard attempt to replicate the context effects. Standard error
bars are given. Solid circles refer to a significant context effect i.e., different from zero, at the 5%
level from a standard χ2 test. Hollow circles refer to no significant difference from zero, and hence no
context effect.
FIGURES 53
Figure XI: Screen-capture of distribution elicitation.
FIGURES 54
Figure XII: Plotting data by choice set and aggregate-PDF values.
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Lighter colours refer to a higher density of plots. The numbers refer to the proportion of points plotted in that
region i.e., the empirical density. Graphics are cropped at 2/5 for quality, and $500; over 95% of the plotting data
is in this range.
